Federal Rail Safety Act Subsection (c)(1) prohibits railroads from denying, delaying, or interfering with the medical treatment “of an employee who is injured during the course of employment.” And (c)(1) also requires that railroads provide prompt transportation to the nearest hospital for employees who are “injured during the course of employment.”

Now, in a case of first impression, a federal court has confirmed the protection of (c)(1) is not limited to “work related” injuries, but applies to any and all injuries that happen to occur while an employee is on duty. And the holding in Jones v. Illinois Central Railroad Company also means FRSA subsection (c)(2) protects employees from discipline for absences ordered by a doctor who is treating an employee for any injury that manifests itself while the employee is on duty, irrespective of the injury’s cause.

Conductor David Jones had hereditary high blood pressure. One evening while at work his head began hurting. A concerned co-worker told his supervisors to call an ambulance, but they failed to do so. By the time Jones was driven to the hospital, he had suffered disabling brain damage.

Jones admitted his brain hemorrhage was triggered by high blood pressure that was not “work related.” But he sued the Railroad for violation of FRSA subsection (c)(1), claiming the Railroad’s delay in obtaining medical treatment for him caused or worsened his brain hemorrhage. The Railroad moved to dismiss the case, arguing (c)(1) only applies to “work-related” injuries and not to preexisting conditions that happen to manifest themselves while at work.

In Jones v. Illinois Central Railroad Company, the federal court held that “an injury occurring while an employee is on duty is sufficient to bring that employee within the scope of subsection (c)(1)’s protection.” The court explained how that conclusion is compelled by the plain meaning of the statute’s text:

The Court holds that (c)(1) unambiguously covers employees who suffer injury while on duty at their place of employment, irrespective of the injury’s cause. This interpretation accords the statute its plain meaning by construing the term “during” in its ordinary sense as a temporal requirement. . . . The statute intends “during the course of employment” to create only a time-based requirement that the injury occur “at some time in the course of employment.”

And Jones explains why this conclusion is fully consistent with the Third Circuit’s decision in the Bala case, PATH v. DOL:

Although the Third Circuit seemingly uses the phrases “on-duty injury” and “work-related injury” interchangeably in its opinion, it may be possible that an injury occurs “during the course of employment” either if it occurred “on duty” or was “work-related” in the sense that it was caused by work. . . . the Third Circuit actually refers to the prerequisite for protection under subsection (c)(1) as a “temporal limitation.”

It is important to note subsection (c)(2) does not use the term “work-related,” and the Third Circuit Bala’s opinion only ruled that (c)(2) incorporated (c)(1)’s “during the course of employment” injury standard. As a result, subsection (c)(2)’s protection from absence discipline applies to any employee who is following his treating doctor’s orders for any injury that occurs “during the course of employment,” even if it is a preexisting non-work related condition that just happens to manifest itself while the employee is on duty.

Bottom line? Any injury that occurs or manifests itself while an employee is on duty is protected by subsections (c)(1) and (c)(2). It doesn’t matter if the injury is not covered by the FELA or is a preexisting non-work related condition that just happens to manifest itself while an employee is on duty. The take away is:

  • It is a violation of subsection (c)(1) for a railroad to deny, delay, or interfere with the medical treatment for any injury that manifests itself during the scope of employment.
  • It is a violation of (c)(1) for a railroad to fail to promptly transport the injured employee to the nearest hospital any injury that manifests itself during the scope of employment.
  • It is a violation of (c)(2) for a railroad to discipline an employee for following the treatment orders of a doctor who is treating the employee for any injury that manifests itself during the scope of employment.
  • It is a violation of (c)(2) for a railroad to discipline employees for absences ordered by doctors treating employees for any injury that manifests itself during the scope of employment.

Here is the Jones v. Illinois Central decision. For more on the rights of railroad whistleblowers under Section 20109 of the Federal Rail Safety Act, go to Rail Whistleblower Library.